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Abstract 
 
The last twenty years has seen a relentless shift to offshore manufacturing as retailers chase 
ever-lower labor costs. The results of this strategy can now be evaluated and we propose that 
some adjustments are in order. We analyze the case of a North American apparel 
manufacturer that has successfully emerged from a period of major change with a strong and 
strategic position in the apparel supply chain.  
 
Griffin Manufacturing, Inc., is a U.S. garment contactor manufacturing athletic wear for major 
national and international brands. For a decade, the strategic goal of one of Griffin’s major 
customers has been to eliminate U.S. factories, and to replace Griffin with offshore 
manufacturing. While 80% of the manufacturing has indeed moved offshore, a critical mass 
remains. This case study documents Griffin’s survival through evolution in capabilities, 
technology, and especially attitude. The Griffin case study suggests that keeping a portion of 
the manufacturing onshore at an agile, quick response factory is cost effective: It increases 
sales and improves margins. However, the new relationship between the parties is much 
more complex and requires commitment on both sides. 
 
 
The Offshore Crisis at Griffin 
In 1990, foreseeing competitive offshore pressures, Griffin changed its mission to the 
production of athletic apparel, and working with a small, innovative company, Griffin 
produced some of the first-ever jogging bras. Griffin invested in new sewing machines and by 
1993 was producing 20,000 garments per week. Since then, Griffin has steadily grown 20% 
annually to a current volume of $20 million. 
 
A dramatic change occurred in 1993 when our small, innovative customer was taken over by 
a large, multinational corporation that immediately attempted to move the manufacturing to 
Honduras. We can now look back on several cycles in which new managers visited Griffin 
with the goal of eliminating the last “irritating amount” of domestic manufacturing. After 
these meetings orders would abruptly fall to zero, but within weeks would start to flow 
again. The usual explanation was that some “unexpected event” had occurred which 
necessitated "a few" quick response orders. 
 
At first, the sewing that moved offshore was of basic styles. “Basics” are the ongoing styles in 
a few colors that sell all year round. It made sense to move these offshore because with just a 
few styles, the training machinery requirements were less. Also, what remained were fashion 
styles, and the response time for these was much shorter. Twice a year the design department 
created entirely new lines that involved managing colors through lab dips, constructing 
prototypes, making pattern changes to ensure correct fit, and producing sales samples. 
Griffin’s ability to respond quickly to these issues was an essential asset in meeting design 
department schedules. In addition, assigning fashion production to Griffin allowed the 
design department even more time for their activities. 
 
However, our customer’s manufacturing department was indifferent to our relation with the 
design group, they simply saw the extra 'dollar-a-garment' manufacturing cost. It took 
considerable work on Griffin’s part to educate the senior management in the entire scope of 
their relation with Griffin.  
 
The take over by the multinational corporation dramatically increased the overall production 
volume, as investments in advertising and infrastructure bore fruit. One line which began as 
4 styles in black, white, oxford, and navy, soon evolved to include new styles and fashion 
colors, two fashion seasons per year, and a significant increase in garment complexity.  
 
It became clear to everyone that our customer's forecasting was much more uncertain for 
fashion styles. A trend developed where the fashion seasons were divided into multiple 
deliveries, the first occurring just in time for the beginning of the season. Then, as early sales 
data accumulated, forecasts would be adjusted and new orders placed. Griffin worked very 
closely with our customer's analysts to mix and match fabric and garments, skews, and 
production to the emerging sales picture. Daily conference calls resulted in instant changes to 
cutting schedules and production runs. 
 
Interestingly, retailers would frequently rapidly change their orders of both fashion and basics 
during the season. This resulted in quick response orders of basics, which also had to be sewn 
at Griffin. 
 
Meanwhile, another strategic trend was emerging. The athletic wear business was becoming 
more competitive as marketing departments began to advertise products claiming that their 
fabrics made athletes run faster. The result was a dramatic increase in the diversity of fabrics, 
the number of styles, and the complexity of the styles themselves. 
 
For a couple of years we continued to average 15,000 garments per week, but the fluctuations 
were huge, which was extremely disrupting to efficient manufacturing. Also, the gradually 
increasing complexity of the styles exacerbated the production flow problems.  
 
We feared that the domestic production would eventually fall to zero, but by 1998, we had 
struggled to reach a new accommodation, as Griffin’s share of production leveled off at 20%, 
with 80% going to Honduras. In concert with our customer, we had evolved a completely 
new business model, which is the focus of this case study. 
 
 
Emerging Cooperative Relationship 
Griffin's mode of operation gradually evolved to provide quick response manufacturing. This 
required significant investment in technology, including CAD for patterns and markers, 
automated cutting, and information system improvements including a factory-wide 
management information system. Concurrently, staff expertise grew to include planning and 
logistics. Also, Griffin began to take on the inventory of some fabrics to facilitate quick 
response. 
 
While the number of sewing machine operators has remained essentially constant for a 
decade, the capabilities of the organization have changed dramatically. In 1990, Griffin 
employed approximately 200 sewing machine operators, producing 20,000 garments per 
week. Griffin still employs those operators, but now they only represent 20% of the garments 
we cut. Griffin cuts an additional 80,000 garments per week, packing and shipping the parts 
for assembly in Honduras. 
 
Interestingly, we have always had a very close relationship with our customer’s design team. 
They like the overnight turnaround for their prototypes and samples. Pattern changes are 
now exchanged via email. However, the relationship with their manufacturing department 
has not always been so smooth, and the evolution of our working agreement is an interesting 
aspect of this case study. 
 
 
The Problem 
To make this case study more specific, we will focus on a typical garment, a medium-range 
jogging bra. This particular garment was created in the early nineties to fill a specific market 
void. The business in high end, technically sophisticated, jogging bras was growing 
explosively. There was a niche for a less expensive version to sell in chain stores where price 
was a significant factor. 
 
A Taiwan fabric was selected and the garment was to be assembled in Honduras, 
immediately exposing Griffin to both import and export issues. This particular bra has six 
minutes of sewing labor. The average labor rate at Griffin is approximately $7.50 per hour, 
resulting in a direct labor cost around $0.75. However, labor rates in Honduras are around 
$0.29 per hour, for an assembly cost of $0.03.  
 
These are direct labor costs. Since overhead costs are typically at least twice labor costs, 
reasonable estimates for the total labor costs are: Griffin, $1.50, Honduras, $0.06. 
 
Of course, transportation and logistics costs have to be added to the Honduras labor costs. 
Transportation is one of the great modern bargains. Filling a standard container with these 
bras, and shipping them to Honduras costs less than a penny a garment. However, even 
generously allowing for some additional costs, it is quite reasonable to assume that a savings 
of $1 per garment is realizable. The basic question becomes:  
 
If you can sew the garment in Honduras for less than five 
cents, why bother making it in the USA for $1.50? 
 
Griffin was averaging about 750,000 garments per year. This explains why from 1994 through 
1998 the goal of our customer’s upper management was to eliminate domestic 
manufacturing, and save $750,000 per year. This goal became embodied in a simple slogan 
“Every time Griffin makes a garment, it costs us a dollar.” 
 
 
Formalizing the Solution 
Over time, we gradually educated our customer about the value of permanently keeping 20% 
of the manufacturing in the U.S. Griffin’s value was always obvious to us, but we had to learn 
to quantify it, to actively promote ourselves, and even to negotiate informal production 
agreements. The hard lessons for manufacturers are presented below. 
 
The basic question remains: If you can save a dollar a garment by manufacturing offshore, 
why not make everything there? The answer has three parts, and we will look at each of these 
in turn. 
 
• The Honduras cost of $0.06 is not the real cost, there are many hidden costs.  
• Fluctuations in consumer buying patterns, and retailers demanding instant response, 
stress the long production cycle times associated with offshore production.  
• The costs of excess, unsold inventory can far exceed the savings from offshore 
manufacturing. 
 
a) Hidden Offshore Costs 
The Honduras labor cost of six cents is nowhere near the real cost. Operator efficiency is 
significant lower than in the USA. This efficiency (slowly!) improves over time as operators 
learn and companies invest in new machines. Turnover in Caribbean factories can be very 
high, and rates of 40% per year are not unheard of. Staff turnover dramatically affects both 
throughput and quality. New operators must be trained until they can reach satisfactory 
production and quality levels. 
 
Logistics problems arise continually, and additional, expensive staffs are required to manage 
the import and export of fabric and garments. A favorite Griffin example involves the 
garment labels that show the country of manufacture, as well as style information, bar codes, 
washing instructions, etc. These labels are frequently late because they require detailed 
information from several different departments, and coordination is notoriously difficult. 
They are also small and tend to get lost. As a result, these labels are frequently express mailed 
around the world. Air mailing labels can be more expensive than the garment's labor. 
 
There are also overheads that are not always correctly attributed to the manufacturing 
budget. A U.S. manufacturer that takes on a relationship with a factory in the Caribbean 
incurs significant overhead expenses as staff members travel abroad to correct problems.  
 
While these costs are noticeable, they do not change the basic equation. The potential offshore 
savings are so great that considerable staff growth in logistics and significant inefficiencies in 
manufacturing can be absorbed. However, based on our Griffin experiences, we would warn 
companies not to be naive about the continual problems that arise in dealing with offshore 
production. It seems that managers frequently feel that each new problem is unusual, and 
once they get past it, they’ll be alright. At Griffin we would recast that observation as, “The 
problem may be unusual, but there are always others, equally unusual, right behind it.” 
 
b) Fluctuating Demand – "The 500 White Shorts Problem" 
There is a significant trend in the retailing industry towards instant delivery, which the 
following example dramatically illustrates. Late one Monday, Griffin received a desperate 
phone call and an emergency order for 500 white shorts with a 48-hour delivery schedule. 
Griffin had fabric on hand, and because we had often made this style before, the necessary 
infrastructure was in place: markers, trained operators, etc. We cut and sewed the shorts, 
shipping them out on Wednesday as requested. 
 
While the order itself was not unusual, the stress and concern expressed by our customer 
was. We began to investigate the order and eventually, the economic analysis of the “500 
White Shorts” problem provided us with the first quantifiable cost justification of our quick 
response manufacturing capability. 
 
Our customer had received an order worth $950,000, but the delivery date was only 5 days 
later. What made this particular order unusual were the conditions: Either every item had to 
be completely fulfilled (i.e., every style, color, and size) or nothing was to be shipped. 
Inventory analysis showed that the only items not in stock were 500 white shorts. Hence, the 
desperate phone call and the emergency order. 
 
Remember that we were constantly being measured by the slogan “Every time Griffin makes 
a garment, it costs us a dollar.” And yet here was a case where our customer could generate 
almost a million dollars in sales only because Griffin was around to make the 500 white shorts. The 
extra cost of one dollar per garment ($500 in this case) was inconsequential compared to the 
opportunity to generate $950,000 in sales. 
 
After some discussion, our customer did in fact analyze their sales to determine the number 
of such occurrences, and their value. From Griffin’s perspective the results were extremely 
encouraging. They estimated that between 5 and 8 times a year, one-shot, fast turnaround 
orders arrived with a value of $8-$10 million, and accounted for some 10% of sales. However, 
that 10% of sales was seen as critical because it frequently represented new accounts or new 
distribution channels. Also, sales growth is an extremely important goal in their corporate 
hierarchy. After further analysis they concluded that they could "afford" 500,000 garments per 
year at Griffin, and this became the baseline for our mutual agreement. 
 
For the first time, Griffin had found a cost justification to help move our customer away from 
their goal of manufacturing everything offshore. When they argue that we cost them a dollar 
for every garment, we now reply ‘Yes, but without us you wouldn’t make your sales goals.’ 
 
c)  Forecast Errors 
It is not unusual for both retailers and manufacturers to make a 25% error in the sales forecast 
of a significant percentage of styles. The forecasts for basic, ongoing styles are usually rather 
better than this, but forecasts for fashion items are notoriously much worse. 
 
The following example illustrates the dramatic impact of forecasting errors. Suppose that the 
sales forecast for the above, mid-range, jogging bra is 1,000 units. The current trend of 
manufacturing everything offshore means that an order for 1,000 units must be placed some 
6-9 months in advance. It is only when the season begins that the true customer demand is 
realized. 
 
Forecast  
1,000 
Offshore 
Order 
1,000 
Customer 
Demand 
1,250 
Customer 
Demand 
750 
- 250 Unhappy Customers  
- Lost Sales 
- 250 Excess Garments 
- Declining Margins 
- Sales Cannibalization 
 
Figure 1. The consequences of forecast errors. 
 
The results of a 25% error in a forecast are summarized in Figure 1. If the demand is high, the 
store will not have the inventory to satisfy their customers. Not only will the store lose sales, 
they run the risk of turning off the customers who came to buy. 
 
If the demand is low, the store will be left with excess inventory. Some excess is acceptable 
because the store can draw in customers with sales and discounts. However, the overall result 
is very costly. Again using our jogging bra data, the store purchased 250 extra garments at 
$10, therefore accumulating $2,500 of excess inventory. It is interesting to compare that excess 
to the labor savings from offshore manufacturing. We used the benchmark of $1 per garment 
in labor savings, so the manufacture of 1,000 garments offshore saved $1,000, significantly 
less than the $2,500 excess inventory. 
 
Suppose the store offered a two-for-one sale. They might argue that they will at least recover 
their wholesale cost. However, the overall margin for that style declines. There is also a 
hidden cost associated with selling the excess inventory at a discount. A customer who buys 
two items does not need to come in next season to buy another one. We refer to this 
“cannibalization of sales.” The conclusion from this brief overview is that forecast errors can 
be much more costly than the savings from manufacturing offshore.  
 
 
The New "Agreement" 
Despite the dramatic potential cost savings from offshore manufacturing, Griffin still 
manufactures approximately 20% of the volume in the USA. However, it has been a struggle 
to educate our customer to the quantitative value of quick response, domestic manufacturing. 
We finally evolved a working relationship in which we are somewhat less than legal partner, 
and yet more than just a vendor. 
 
The agreement is real, if imprecise. They attempt to provide us with orders of about 10,000 – 
15,000 garments per week. We agree to make whatever they order. In addition, we provide a 
whole range of (non manufacturing) services that they need, but on which we make little or 
no money. In other words, we maintain an entire infrastructure that they can call upon, and 
in return, we get a manufacturing base that can support the infrastructure.  
 
Over time, at Griffin we came to think of ourselves as a Quick Response manufacturer. To 
support that idea, we have invested significantly in infrastructure improvements. The 
schedule of technical investments at Griffin were: 
 
Year Innovation 
85: Piece work rates, bar codes for sewing operations. Garment time studies for cost 
estimation, pricing, and payroll. 
90: Beginnings of MIS. Scheduling system to manage production. Computation of weekly 
sales goals. 
92: Embroidery machine, first diversification 
93: CAD system for patterns & markers. Automated cutting. 
94: Evolution of MIS to include management of schedules for imported fabric. Offshore 
Logistics capability. 
95: Bills of Materials for costing & pricing. 
96: Purchase order & Inventory management system. 
98: Database of garment costing operations 
99: Quality fabric inspection functions 
00: Continuous fabric & trim inventory. 
01: Work scheduling for Caribbean plants 
 
The introduction of CAD and automated cutting allowed us to grow the number of garments 
we cut from 20,000 to 100,000. Also, an automatic cutting machine doesn’t care how 
complicated the pattern is, which immunized us against some of the increasing garment 
complexity. Automated cutting also improves sewing quality, since every cut part is identical 
and the operators do not have to adjust the pieces to match. 
 
Automated cutting required computer aided design of markers, which also significantly 
improved our fabric utilization efficiency. We saved one customer over $1,000,000 in fabric 
the first year that automated cutting went into production. 
 
 
Griffin's "Attitude Adjustment" 
Along with the changes in technology, a significant evolution in Griffin’s management 
philosophy also had to occur. We viewed ourselves as "in competition" with the Honduras 
factory, and resented every unit that went abroad. Eventually, we came to realize that we 
could never compete on price, but that we did have a legitimate and cost effective role. We 
evolved to think of ourselves as a Quick Response manufacturer. The days of large, stable 
production runs have disappeared, but the reality is that we can survive by teaming with a 
customer and quickly adjusting our production schedule to meet the instantaneous demand. 
 
Once we realized that there we could quantitatively justify our existence, we understood 
better which customers we wanted to team with, and which jobs we could realistically 
compete for. We also set about educating our customers about the kind relationship we 
required, and specifically sought out customers willing to develop a long-term relationship.  
 
We continue to invest in technology that expands our capabilities, aiming to provide a full 
line of services once a garment design is created. However, with all customers we stress that 
there must be a base level of manufacturing at Griffin, or we are not interested. 
 
Further, providing a broader range of services gives us some flexibility in pricing. s. For 
example, by taking on the fabric inventory, and providing a full package price to a designer, 
we have much more flexibility and can often hide some of the expensive labor costs.  
 
With package prices, we have found that it is often possible to satisfy our customers’ price 
goals with a mixture of domestic and offshore manufacturing. We can then offer services that 
designers like (quick response to design changes, sample production, etc.). Customers are 
also attracted to the idea that a certain proportion of garments can be manufactured locally 
with quick response. They can increase sales by responding to surges in demand. Our 
survival strategy is summarized below: 
 
Management Philosophy 
• Willing to invest in new approaches 
• Willing to manufacture 20%  
• Seek teaming arrangements.  
• Cooperate with Offshore Manufacturers What’s in it for us? 
• Willing to make any style (within reason) 
 
Directed Investment 
• Invest in Management Information to handle complexity  
• CAD for complexity of styles  
• Variety of styles requires automation 
 
Product Selection 
• Forget “T” shirts 
• Look for new fabrics and products 
• Efficient yield for expensive fabrics 
 
 
The New Model 
The changes at Griffin provide an example of an interesting new model. One cannot stop the 
trend to offshore manufacturing. However, the case can be made that there might be a valid, 
long term, survival strategy when offshore production levels off at about 70% - 80%. The new 
strategy is based on the following observations: 
 
• A significant portion of orders requires “instant” response. 
• Forecasting accuracy is quite poor for a significant percentage of styles. 
• Excess inventory is very expensive. 
 
Therefore, we propose dividing production between offshore and onshore, and immediately 
emphasize that we are not proposing to send some styles offshore, but dividing up the 
production of each style. The process begins with a sales forecast for every style. Then, most of 
the production is assigned to an offshore facility. Since offshore production is less expensive, 
the amount produced there should be as much as possible. 
 
On the other hand, since forecast errors result in excess inventory, which is very expensive, 
we propose not to assign the entire forecast offshore. When the season begins, and actual 
customer orders occur, we make projections for the final sales. In concert with a domestic 
manufacturer, new orders are placed to meet the new demand. The situation is summarized 
below in Figure 2. 
Forecast  
1,000 
Offshore 
Order 
800 
Customer 
Demand 
1,250 
Customer 
Demand 
750 
- Happy Customers 
- Increased Sales 
- Slight margin 
    decrease 
- No Excess 
    Garments 
- Stable Margins 
- No Sales  
    Cannibalization 
QR Mfg 
makes 
450 
QR Mfg 
makes 
zero! 
 
Figure 2. The quick response case. 
 
Retailers and manufacturers should be encouraged to analyze their forecast history and 
assess which styles are likely to have inaccurate forecasts. For products with risky forecasts, it 
is reasonable to assign a lower percentage offshore and reserve capacity at a quick response 
manufacturer. On the other hand, for basic styles that sell throughout the year, a much higher 
percentage can be assigned offshore. 
 
There is a clear case that for typical forecast accuracies, the margins for a mixed offshore-
onshore production strategy is competitive with the offshore only case. (Warburton and 
Warner, 2000) Margins improve and sales increase because the quick response manufacturer 
can take advantage of the early sales information to produce more of the styles the customers 
are demanding. 
 
 
Sharing the Pain 
There are a number of challenges associated with the proposed strategy because it is a much 
more complex and uncertain approach. Rather than simply ordering to forecast, the retailer or 
manufacturer has to analyze forecasts, decide on offshore commitments, and team up with a 
domestic manufacturer.  
 
When sales increase, everyone will be satisfied. The retailer sells more products with fewer 
markdowns, resulting in less excess inventory. Also, the manufacturer can make minor 
adjustments (e.g., fill in sizes) to further tailor the inventory to the actual demand. Finally, 
there will be less cannibalization of future sales. 
 
However, there is a much more difficult issue that must be addressed early on in the teaming 
arrangement: If sales decline, the temptation for the retailer is simply to order nothing from 
the domestic team member. If that happens, the domestic manufacturer ceases to exist. It is 
important for the retailer to realize that they are trading capacity for inventory. By ordering 
80% from offshore, the retailer is asking the domestic manufacturer to reserve the other 20% 
as capacity. If the forecast does not materialize, then the retailer is obligated to fill the capacity 
with some type of manufacturing. 
 
The challenge for both parties is to find something that fills the reserved capacity and yet is 
cost effective for both parties. In the above situation, Griffin's customer occasionally assigns 
black or navy jogging bras or shorts to fill the manufacturing voids. These basic items sell all 
year round, and represent a small inventory risk. There are other strategies, including starting 
a season's manufacturing early. Finding those fill-in items is a challenge to both parties, but 
the partnership cannot survive unless the challenge is met. 
 
Retailers undoubtedly recognize that forecast errors are expensive. This new approach shows 
that planning to deal with them can be cost effective. In the past, retailers sent orders to 
manufacturers with no thought of working with them on the actual demand. An adversarial 
relationship often developed as each party pursued their individual goals. In the new, 
proposed approach, a genuine partnership has to evolve. 
 
 
Protective Inventory and Protective Capacity 
We can tie this case study into several emerging supply chain trends. Hill developed the 
original work on trade-offs (Skinner, 1969) using the classic process choices of jobbing, batch 
and line. (Hill, 1998) Although there are many hybrids, this simple classification provides an 
understanding of the nature of business decision-making, namely, that trade-offs, or 
conflicting performance variables exist and need to be acknowledged in the marketing-
manufacturing alignment. 
 
At Griffin we do not take on New Product Development, which typically requires a fast 
response, jobbing process. Agile Manufacturing, or "Jobbing," is usually thought of as 
requiring a manufacturing set-up for each new order. (Agility is associated with a supply 
chain that can accommodate both a non-standard product and instability in demand.) At 
Griffin, although the styles change from day to day, the operations do not. By specializing in 
athletic wear, operations such as setting elastic and flatlock seams are constants. The precise 
details of the styles at the set elastic machine may vary slightly, but there is no set-up in the 
jobbing sense. 
 
Also, by establishing a minimum manufacturing size of around 1,000 units, we keep the 
factory reasonably efficient. At Griffin we describe ourselves as Quick Response (not agile) 
manufacturers. The volatile forecasts limit the use of protective inventory. On the other hand, 
Griffin's protective capacity enables the flow. 
 
T-shirts represent products that are poorly suited to Griffin. They represent a low cost, non-
fashion item, and therefore the value of the finished inventory buffer is low. At the other end 
of the spectrum, high value fashion products are sensitive to both forecast variation and 
obsolescence. The requirement for fast response to consumer buying patterns puts emphasis 
on protective capacity at Griffin. However, it is important to note Griffin's arrangement to fill 
the excess capacity when demand is low. 
 
The Honduras operation competes on price but requires protective inventory, which is due to 
location as well as process focus. The development of lean manufacturing and subsequently 
lean thinking (Womack & Jones, 1996) emphasises the elimination of waste across the supply 
chain and the role of incremental inventory reduction in exposing sources of waste. Lean 
operations are most closely associated with a stable product range and level scheduling. 
Production in Honduras is characterized by level scheduling of lines devoted to single 
products, and presumably, the application of lean thinking is appropriate there. 
 
Griffin competes on delivery speed, but requires protective capacity to accommodate the 
demand uncertainty. The trade-off can be viewed as protective capacity versus protective 
inventory. In the longer term, Honduras should increasingly focus on developing lean 
operations where price is an order winner with minimal WIP inventory. 
 
Relating the concepts of lean and agile to process choice helps to present these topical concepts 
as extreme points on a continuum rather than separate paradigms. This presents lean as a 
development most suited to the stable, line production end of the continuum focused on 
eliminating waste, and where price is an order winner. At the other extreme, agile is 
associated with product variety and demand volatility, and where responsiveness is an order 
winner. The process continuum between these two extremes is demonstrated by Griffin's 
definition of a hybrid (Quick Response) with elements of both. 
 
Conclusions 
We conclude that domestic, high wage, manufacturers can make the case that they have a 
legitimate and cost effective role. However, the role of quick response depends on seeking out 
teams, getting involved in forecasting, reducing the production cycle time, and sharing of 
data throughout the supply chain. Therefore, to survive, a modern domestic contractor must 
invest in the technology required to sustain a quick response capability.  
 
The Griffin case study demonstrates the important link between sales forecasting accuracy 
and the need for quick response manufacturing. If retailers and manufacturers examine their 
history of forecasting errors, they can predict how much domestic manufacturing they will 
need, for which types of styles, and when it is cost effective. Using a domestic contractor as an 
integrated partner can financially reward all members of the team. However, to make the 
partnership work requires extensive planning and cooperation, and at all management levels 
of the partnership. 
 
Using this case for guidance, we anticipate that a retailer teaming with a quick response 
manufacturer would have lower inventory, and yet still have the stock to satisfy more 
customers with fewer markdowns. The manufacturer should see increased margins and 
lower inventories. The offshore contractor’s production can be smoothed out, a significant 
benefit when considering the typical fixed commitment, offshore contracts.  
 
The use of the concepts of protective inventory and protective capacity provide useful 
parameters for linking this lean-agile continuum. Griffin finds useful the idea of our customer 
trading protective inventory for protective capacity. It is an important insight that clearly 
indicates the resource implications in providing the response capability. 
 
We began by noting the relentless trend to offshore manufacturing, and asked if domestic 
apparel employment will inevitably fall to zero. We can now begin to answer the question. 
One survival approach for domestic manufacturers is to aggressively seek out cooperative 
ventures with retailers, and even offshore contractors. To survive, domestic manufacturers 
will need to invest in the technology that ensures the role of quick response manufacturing is 
within their grasp. 
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